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ABSTRACT 
As people store more personal data in their smartphones, 
the consequences of having it stolen or lost become an 
increasing concern. A typical counter-measure to avoid this 
risk is to set up a secret code that has to be entered to 
unlock the device after a period of inactivity. However, for 
blind users, PINs and passwords are inadequate, since entry 
1) consumes a non-trivial amount of time, e.g. using screen 
readers, 2) is susceptible to observation, where nearby 
people can see or hear the secret code, and 3) might collide 
with social norms, e.g. disrupting personal interactions.  
Tap-based authentication methods have been presented and 
allow unlocking to be performed in a short time and support 
naturally occurring inconspicuous behavior (e.g. concealing 
the device inside a jacket) by being usable with a single 
hand. This paper presents a study with blind users (N = 16) 
where an authentication method based on tap phrases is 
evaluated. Results showed the method to be usable and to 
support the desired inconspicuity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The growing capabilities and increasing adoption of 
smartphones is transferring privacy and security risks from 
our desks to our pockets. A typical way to mitigate these 
risks is to set up an authentication barrier that has to be 
overcome after a period of device inactivity. The unlocking 
procedure comes, however, with costs. Unlocking takes 
time, which must be multiplied by the number of occasions 
one pulls the device from the pocket. Additionally, 
authenticating creates an interruption that obstructs a 
primary objective, e.g. reading an email, thus potentially 
causing frustration. Finally, mobile authentication is 
particularly susceptible to observation attacks – a third 
party discerning one’s secret code – since devices are often 
used outside controlled environments like home or office. 
To blind users, authenticating with touch-based 
smartphones raises even more usability and security 
barriers. Let us consider using a PIN with a screen reader, 
such as iPhone’s VoiceOver1. As the user passes its fingers 
through the screen, a voice reads out the key. When the 
right key is found, the user can split or double tap it to 
select. Azenkot et al. [2] found that even in a sample of 
blind users familiarized with this technology, unlocking 
took in excess of 7 seconds, which may be too cumbersome 
for large-scale adoption. Furthermore, it is susceptible to 
observation: the process of selecting each digit is visible to 
bystanders if a method to hide the screen is not used (e.g., 
iPhone’s screen curtain). This can be particularly 
troublesome if we consider situations where blind people 
are less aware of their surroundings than sighted people. 
Aural eavesdropping is also a risk – it is conceivable that 
blind people could use headphones, but that would not only 
require time to put them on but also reduce awareness of 
surroundings. Finally, limitations imposed by social norms 
should also be considered – using visible authentication 
mechanisms can be embarrassing or raise fears of being 
perceived as distrustful of others. 
In this paper, we contribute with a study on inconspicuous 
authentication, based on tap phrases, for blind people. 
Besides feasibility and performance, we report strategies 
mentioned by participants on how these methods could be 
used to mitigate security threats. 
RELATED WORK 
Tap-based authentication has been previously addressed in 
the literature. Bianchi et al. [2] propose using taps to insert 
PINs recurring to the number of touch events. PassChords 
[1] is specifically targeted to blind users. In this system, 
multi-finger touches, using a chord analogy, are used. 
These works do not allow unbounded tap pattern lengths, 
nor take into consideration the tap and break time spans, 
instead being focused on tap counts and location. The first 
severely reduces the tap phrases selection space. The 
second is prone to screen smudge detection and most 
notably limits the space for inconspicuous interaction 
strategies. For example, it does not afford operations with a 
single hand, rendering the most accepted concealing 
strategies impossible. Forcing authenticating in conspicuous 
ways draws attention to the use of assistive technology, 
potentially leading to feelings of self-consciousness [7]. 
1  http://www.apple.com/accessibility 
                                                          
In TapSongs [8] users can configure tapping patterns 
representing songs. However, it uses a parametric approach, 
requiring at least 5 examples for configuration. For 
gestures, Li [4] points out that, only very few examples 
should be needed for subsequent accurate recognition. For 
taps, the case is even more evident. Using many examples 
and parametric approaches is prone to create a build-up of 
noise that prevents keeping the success rates and/or 
performance low, especially in low-end devices. Moreover, 
it discourages the configuration of long and securer codes. 
Also, to our knowledge, TapSongs has not been 
implemented in smartphones or similar devices, turning the 
user studies less realistic.  
Ghomi et al. [3] attempt to generalize rhythmic 
authentication into a more general input method based on 
rhythm, making use of both taps and breaks. In this work 
the types of words that can exist are bounded to 5 – three 
varieties of tap and two of break, varying in canonical 
duration. Again the tap phrase selection space is limited. In 
our previous work [5], we devised a similar approach but 
enabling sequences of unbounded length and requiring only 
one template to record them. 
Tap-based authentication has been previously presented as 
a method that enables non-visual usage. Still, particularly 
methods that allow concealing and one-hand usage, they 
have not been evaluated with blind people. It is paramount 
to understand how blind people cope with these tapping 
methods as well as their acceptance and concealing 
strategies. 
USER STUDY 
To validate tap phrase unlocking as a feasible approach to 
address the threats posed by traditional authentication, an 
exploratory user study with 16 blind participants was 
conducted. We addressed both the experience of using tap 
patterns for unlocking and the affordance of this method to 
inconspicuous interaction. Additionally, we extracted the 
patterns chosen by the users to develop an efficient 
matching algorithm, which we describe in section 5. 
Specifically, our objectives were to understand if, after a 
short learning period, users could: 1) Perform 
authentication with a single hand easily and in a reasonable 
amount of time; and 2) confabulate strategies for 
inconspicuous authentication.  
Authentication method 
The tap-based authentication method used in this study was 
the one presented in [5]. This method uses tapping 
sequences on a touch screen. The Hamming distance-based 
matching approach accommodates rich tapping patterns of 
unbounded length, taking into consideration both the times 
where the user is pressing and the ones in which she 
releases. Additionally, it tries to match every pattern 
candidate as the user interacts with the device, thus 
dispensing timeouts for successful authentication. 
Materials 
For the experiments, a single Samsung Galaxy mini 
smartphone, with Android 2.3, was used. The prototype 
application for tap unlocking was used. A training mode 
Figure 1. Tap Phrase Authentication for all 16 participants. First line shows the recorded template and the next one shows the 
attempt to replicate it by the same participant. 
was available in which data was not recorded and optional 
sound output (emission of a tone while the screen was being 
touched) was available. On data-recording mode, there 
were facilities for configuring a tap pattern template and 
afterwards to attempt unlocking, both without audio 
feedback. A short vibration was emitted on successful 
unlock. Success was determined by two factors: 1) the input 
and template having the same number of taps and 2) the 
input having total time span no more or less than 20% that 
of the template. This crude algorithm, not suited for 
authentication, was used so that users could have a more 
realistic understanding of the system. Logs were generated 
for offline analysis.  
Paper questionnaires were employed to gather demographic 
data, register responses to the Single Ease Question (SEQ), 
and record concealment strategies suggested by 
participants. The SEQ, proposed by Sauro and Dumas [6], 
is known to have good psychometric properties, and was 
administered immediately after the task (“Overall, this task 
was?”, Very Easy=7, Very difficult=1).  
Participants 
The 16 participants were volunteers recruited in a local 
training institution for blind people. Two participants had 
some residual vision. Ages varied between 26 and 64 years 
old, the average being 47 (SD = 12). Twelve participants 
were male and 4 female. Although all participants had 
mobile phones, they reported having none or very little 
experience with touch-screen devices. Eleven reported 
being very familiar with using PINs in electronic devices, 
albeit in physical keyboards. Participants reported never or 
rarely using headphones paired with their mobile devices. 
Procedure 
Participants were initially introduced to the concepts and 
explained the tasks they were asked to perform. At this 
stage, they were given no mention that the tap unlocking 
was method being proposed by the researchers. They were 
handed a device to feel and get accustomed to while being 
administered a short demographic questionnaire.  
In a first stage, a training session lasting approximately 5 
minutes was conducted, in the following steps: 
1. Users freely explored the touch-screen area with their 
fingers. When they touched any point in the screen, an 
audio tone was emitted. Participants were explained that 
the whole screen acted as a single button and explored 
the fact that tap phrases are composed of taps and breaks 
lasting in time. 
2. Users were asked to imagine tap phrases that they could 
record and later use for unlocking. They experimented 
freely, with sound enabled, until they were confident that 
they had grasped the concept. 
3. Users were introduced to the vibrotactile feedback 
emitted on authentication success (short) and failure 
(long). 
4. With sound output now removed, users conducted a 
complete dry-run, first configuring a template of their 
choice, then attempting to unlock. 
5. Step 2 was repeated, this time participants using the 
device with a single hand. 
After training, still using a single hand, participants were 
asked to again configure a template and then try to unlock. 
This time, the interaction was recorded in log files. 
Immediately after completing this task, users responded to 
the Single Ease Question. 
In the second stage of this study, participants were 
reminded of the observation threat and asked to imagine 
strategies they could use to conceal the input from potential 
observers. To facilitate this process, participants engaged in 
role-playing two scenarios: a meeting and a commute in 
public transportation. To that end, they were given a 
smartphone so they could simulate authentication. A 
facilitator gravitated at times around the participant to make 
him aware of possible visual observation angles. In the end, 
participants were asked to summarize the viable strategies 
they had identified.  
Measures 
For the unlocking task, we acquired:  
1. The time it took to complete authentication with a single 
hand, measured from the moment a facilitator clicked a 
start button and initiated the unlocking application to 
the moment an input was accepted as the correct secret 
code; 
2. The number of input errors, and; 
3. The SEQ rating, from 1 to 7.  
For the elicitation part of this study, the strategies indicated 
by participants were recorded and occurrences counted. 
Since the alternatives mentioned were clear and not very 
numerous, no special categorization was performed. 
Results 
After training, all users were able to authenticate in the first 
trial, so there were no input errors to record.  
Figure 1 presents the recorded tap phrases along with the 
attempt to replicate it for all 16 users. 
The mean task completion time was 4.32s, with standard 
deviation 2.1s. A Shapiro-Wilk test suggests that the data is 
normally distributed (S-W = .890, df = 16, p = .056). A 
one-sample t test was conducted at an alpha level of .05 to 
evaluate if tap unlocking is faster than the 7.52s mean for 
PIN with VoiceOver found by Azenkot et al. [1]. The test 
has shown to be significant (t = -6.062, df = 15, p = .000, 
Cohen’s d = -1.52), suggesting that unlocking with taps is 
faster than the current mainstream method (Voice Over).  
The median SEQ score was 6 (IQR = 3), where 7 means 
“very easy” and 1 “very difficult”, indicating that 
participants perceived tap unlocking as being easy to 
perform. 
In the second stage of our study, we elicited inconspicuous 
authentication strategies through role-playing. The user-
suggested approaches are summarized in Table 1. Each user 
contributed, on average, 3 strategies (SD = 1). The top 
suggestions, with 9 occurrences, were performing 
authentication under the table or inside a pocket. 
Discussion 
The results for task completion time and perceived easiness 
of authenticating with tap phrases are encouraging. Even so, 
the relatively large standard deviation in task completion 
time deserves a closer look. From our observations, there 
are two possible explanations for this fact: 1) some users, 
lacking the confidence and experience using smartphones, 
operated the device with an unusual level of caution, thus 
taking more time and 2) there may be, in fact, an extended 
initial period where a blind user needs to situate himself 
before starting tapping with confidence. 
Strategy Occurrences 
Under the table 9 
Inside pocket 9 
Occluded by clothes (e.g. jacket) 7 
Cover with one hand 5 
Lean device against body 3 
Inside bag / purse 3 
Using device upside down 3 
Move to an isolated location 2 
Under the seat 1 
Postpone 1 
Table 1.Concealing strategies suggested by study participants. 
The top suggestions for inconspicuous authentication 
strategies include many cases that are made possible, or at 
least easier, by the tap phrase method. This is true not only 
for blind users, but in any situations where the visual 
channel is not available. Our emphasis focus on affording 
single hand interaction required by some of top suggestions, 
e.g. authenticating inside the pocket or using the free hand 
to cover the interaction. The feasibility of actually using 
some of the selected strategies must, however, be further 
evaluated in realistic settings. For example, using a pocket 
may not be possible because hand movements can be 
constrained. That’s not the case for most of the others. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Mobile devices are increasingly seen as extensions of 
ourselves, permeating our personal and social life. But they 
also create new threats to our well-being that can have 
devastating effects. The ability to self-protect is a universal 
requirement in human endeavors, from which the 
ubiquitous computing enterprise cannot escape if it is to be 
successful and inclusive. In this paper, we presented a novel 
approach for mobile authentication that attempts to foster 
inclusion of blind people in the global trend towards 
smartphone adoption.  
We propose a method in which authentication is 
accomplished by recognizing rich tapping patterns that can 
be performed with a single hand, using a smartphone’s 
entire screen as a single button. We presented results of a 
user study that shows that this method is usable and that it 
affords inconspicuous interactions, thus not only offering 
increased security but also enabling compliance with social 
norms.  
Clear avenues for further research were opened, namely 
exploring longer-term usage and real-world feasibility of 
inconspicuous authentication scenarios, measuring 
resistance to eavesdropping, and expanding the matching of 
tap patterns to accommodate other interactions other than 
authentication.  
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
We thank Fundação Raquel and Martin Sain and the 
participants of the study.  
REFERENCES 
1. Azenkot, S., Rector, K., Ladner, R., Wobbrock. J. 
PassChords: secure multi-touch authentication for blind 
people. In Proc. ASSETS '12, ACM (2012). 
2. Bianchi, A., Oakley, I., Kwon, D.S. Counting 
clicks and beeps: Exploring numerosity based haptic and 
audio PIN entry. Interact. Comput. 24, 5 (2012), 409-422. 
3. Ghomi, E., Faure, G., Huot, S., Chapuis, O., and 
Beaudouin-Lafon, M. Using rhythmic patterns as an input 
method. In Proc. CHI '12. ACM Press (2012) 
4. Li, Y. Protractor: a fast and accurate gesture 
recognizer. In Proc. CHI '10, ACM Press (2010), 2169-
2172. 
5. Marques, D., Guerreiro, T., Duarte, L., Carriço, L. 
(2013). Under the table: tap authentication for 
smartphones. In Proc. of BCS HCI '13, Swinton, UK. 
6. Sauro, J.,  Dumas, J.S. Comparison of three one-
question, post-task usability questionnaires. In Proc. CHI 
'09, ACM Press (2009). 
7. Shinohara, K. & Wobbrock, J.O., 2011. In the 
shadow of misperception: assistive technology use and 
social interactions. In Proc. CHI '12. ACM Press (2012). 
8. Wobbrock, J.O. TapSongs: tapping rhythm-based 
passwords on a single binary sensor. In Proc. UIST '09, 
ACM Press (2009)
